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New York Legislature amended the existing law on the subject.47
In re Hollywood Commissary Inc., 48 wherein a union attempted to
establish a welfare fund claim as a preferred claim in an assignment
for the benefit of creditors proceeding, is the case which necessitated
the statutory amendment. The Hollywood case prompted the New
York Legislature to express legislative intent concerning welfare plans,
and it would certainly seem that the Embassy case should prompt
Congress to act in a similar manner.
Congress has recognized that "in little more than a decade private
employee welfare and pension plans have grown from relatively small
significance to a position where approximately 84 million persons are
depending in some manner upon the benefits which they promise."'49
In view of this recognition Congress should afford the persons relying
upon the plans the protection they are denied by the majority in the
Embassy case; therefore, the dissent of Mr. Justice Black offers the
approach 50 which appears to be more in accord with congressional in-
tent in affording priority in bankruptcy proceedings to claims for
contributions to union welfare funds.
JAMES E. BUcHHoLIz
RIGHTS OF CREDITORS AGAINST HUSBAND
FOR PAYMENT OF WIFE'S BILLS
When confronted with the problem of enforcing the duty of a hus-
band to support his wife,' courts have sometimes found it difficult to
define the nature of this duty.2 This is especially true when a third
4TN.Y.Debt. & Cred. Laws § 22.
"887 N.Y. Supp. 2d 625 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
"See note Bo supra.
""The Bankruptcy Act is remedial, should be interpreted reasonably, accord-
ing to the fair import of its terms, and technicalities should not be indulged in,
wherever a liberal procedure is consistent with the substantial rights of the parties
in interest." In re Reliable Furniture Mfg. Co., 32 F.2d 805, 806 (D. Md. 1929), aff'd
sub nom. Manly v. Hood, 37 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 193o).
1D. H. Holmes Co. v. Huth, 49 So. 2d 875 (La. App. 1951); Ewell v. State, 207
Md. 288, 114 A.2d 66 (1955); McFerren v. Goldsmith-Stern Co., 137 Md. 573, 113
At. 107, Io8 (1921); Garlock v. Garlock, 279 N.Y. 337, 18 N.E.2d 521 (1939); Wana-
maker v. Weaver, 176 N.Y. 75, 68 N.E. 135, 136 (19o3); Bostick v. Brower, 22 Misc.
709, 49 N.Y. Supp. 1o46 (Sup. Ct. 1898); Mihalcoe v. Holub, 130 Va. 425, 107 S.E.
704 (1921); 26 Am. Jur. Husband and Wife § 337 (1940); 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife
§ 15 (1944).
-See Brown, The Duty of the Husband to Support the Wife, iS Va. L. Rev. 823,
824 (1932).
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party who has furnished goods and services to a wife seeks to hold
the husband liable. In such cases there are two principal theories
upon which the third party may hold the husband liable: (i) agency,
when the husband has made the wife his ageht to act of him,3 or
(2) restitution, when the husband has failed to provide the wife with
necessaries.
4
In Barnes Furniture Store v. Young,5 a recent Louisiana case, the
court relied on the agency theory in holding the husband liable. The
plaintiff brought an action against the husband for furniture purchased
by his wife. Since the husband had gone to the store, made part pay-
ment, and promised to keep up the account, the Louisiana Court of
Appeal held the husband liable under the doctrine of ratification.6
Under an agency theory a wife may have either actual or apparent
authority to pledge her husband's credit.1 Actual authority exists when
the husband expressly authorizes his wife to act as his agent,s or does
so by implication, as when he pays bills and thereby consents to the
transactions. These acts will bind him in subsequent similar transac-
tions with the same merchant, and the huband will be liable notwith-
standing the fact that he may have previously supplied her with similar
goods.9 Furthermore, a wife's authority as agent,1° once established,
continues after separation of the parties, and the husband's liability
for purchases on his credit continues until notice of termination of
:"A husband or wife can be authorized to act for the other party to the marital
relation." Restatement (Second), Agency § 22 (1958).
"'A person who has performed the noncontractual duty of another by supplying
a third person with necessaries which in violation of such duty the other had failed
to supply, although acting without the other's knowledge or consent, is entitled to
restitution therefor from the other if he acted unofficiously and with intent to charge
therefor." Restatement, Restitution § 13 (1937). See Restatement (Second), Agency
§ 14(I) (1958).
Iiii So. 2d 549 (La. App. 1959).
Old. at 552.
7Cooper v. Haseltine, 5o Ind. App. 400, 98 N.E. 437 (1912); Smedley v. Sweeten,
i N.J. Super. 39, 77 A.2d 489 (1950); Martin v. Oakes, 42 Misc. 201, 85 N.Y. Supp.
587 (Sup. Ct .1903).
"Actual authority is -o be distinguished from apparent authority when there
has been a previous course of dealing. If the husband has expressly authorized the
wife to act or if he subsequently ratifies her act, actual authority will exist. See
Metier v. Snow, go Conn. 690, 98 At. 322 (,gi6). Apparent authority will exist, how-
ever, when the husband has not given the wife express authority to act, but has in
some way held out to the merchant that the wife is authorized and the merchant
has relied thereon. See Restatement (Second), Agency § 22, illustration 2 (1958).
'Metler v. Snow, go Conn. 69 o , 98 At. 322 (1916).
"-'The agency is a question of fact, Martin v. Oakes, 42 Misc. 201, 85 N.Y. Supp.
387 (Sup. Ct. 19o3), and the creditor has the burden of proving the authority.
McFerren v. Goldsmith-Stem Co., 137 Md. 573, 113 AtI. 107 (1921).
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the authority has been communicated to creditors who knew of the
agency."
Although the husband has not previously authorized the wife to
pledge his credit, he may ratify her act and thereby become liable
under well-established principles of agency. 12 Ratification 3 may be
found if the husband, with knowledge 14 that goods were purchased
on his credit, uses the goods or permits his wife to retain them.15 In
utilizing the theory of ratification in the Barnes case, the court relied
on the earlier Louisiana case of Montgomery v. Gremillion.16 In that
case ratification was found, notwithstanding the husband's original
silence and inaction, because the husband sought adjustments and
more time to pay the account.
A wife may have apparent authority17 when the husband has held
out to the merchant that she is authorized to act as his agent and sub-
sequently forbids her to act for him, but fails to give notice' 8 of this
revocation to the creditor.'9 In a recent District of Columbia case,
Ottenstein v. Julius Garfiinckel & Co.,20 creditors sought judgment
against a husband for goods purchased by his wife. The wife's prior
authority which had been created by an earlier ratification was ter-
minated by the husband on separation, but he failed to give creditors
notice of this termination until several months later. The husband
"Ford v. S. Kann Sons Co., 76 A.2d 358 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 195o); McFerren
v. Goldsmith-Stern Go., 137 Md. 573, 113 Ad. 107 (1921).
12"Ratification is the affirmance by a person of a prior act which did not bind
him but which was done or professedly done on his account, whereby the act, as to
some or all persons, is given effect as if originally authorized by him." Restatement
(Second), Agency § 82 (1958).
"Landgraf v. Tanner, 152 Ala. 511, 44 So. 397 (1907) (subsequent promise);
Ventress v. Gunn, 6 Ala,. App. 226, 6o So. 56o (1912) (furnishing wife with money to
pay bill).
"4Knowledge is an essential element in ratification. Restatement (Second), Agency
§ 91 (1958); Mechem, Agency § 2o6 (4th ed. 1952). But if goods are sold to the wife
upon her credit solely, the husband will not be liable although the sale may have
been made with his knowledge. Noel v. O'Neill, 128 Md. 202, 97 Atl. 513 (iq96).
15Valling v. Hannig, 73 Texas 58o, 11 S.W. 547 (1889).
"69 So. 2d 618 (La. App. 1953).
r7 "[Ajpparent authority to do an act is created as to a third person by written
or spoken words or any other conduct of the principal which, reasonably interpreted,
causes the third person to believe that the principal consents to have the act done
on his behalf by the person purporting to act for him." Restatement (Second),
Agency § 27 (1958).
IsApparent authority will continue after separation of the parties in absence of
notice otherwise. Ford v. S. Kann Sons CO., 76 A.2d 358 (D.C. Munic Ct. App. 195o).
"tAs to a merchant dealing with the wife for the first time, there can be no ap-
parent authority. James McCreery & Co. v. Martin, 84 N.J.L. 626, 87 At. 433 (1913);
Wanamaker v. Weaver, 176 N.Y. 75, 68 N.E. 135 (19o3).
20151 A.2d 925 (1959).
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contended "that he did nothing which would justify the stores in
believing that his wife had authority to pledge his credit." However,
the court held that during the intervening period between separation
and notification he was liable because the wife had apparent au-
thority.
2 1
The marital relationship per se does not make the wife the agent
of her husband.22 On the contrary, the agency of the wife for the hus-
band is governed by the same principles as control the usual principal-
agent relationship.23 Thus, when the creditor is unable to establish
the existence of actual or apparent authority, the sole basis for hold-
ing the husband liable is the theory of restitution.
24
Marriage imposes a duty upon the husband to make adequate pro-
vision for his wife's necessaries25 commensurate with his station and
position in life.20 When the husband fails to perform this duty and
a third party furnishes the necessaries, the husband is liable to the
third party on the theory of restitution, 27 which is predicated upon
the principle of unjust enrichment.
28
Restitution does not apply when the husband has supplied the
necessaries, for in this instance there is no unjust enrichment because
the husband has already fulfilled his obligation. In order to receive
payment in such case the creditor must prove the existence of a true
2ln the Ottenstein case the husband was held liable for the entire period on
the basis of apparent authority. Id. at 927. However, it would seem that until the
husband forbade the wife to pledge his credit there was actual authority, for the
husband ratified her acts by giving her money with which to make payments and
by permitting her to maintain the accounts.
Bergh v. Warner, 47 Minn. 250, 50 NAV. 77 (189q); Smedley v. Sweeten, xi N.J.
Super. 39, 77 A.2d 489 (195o); Wanamaker v. Weaver, 176 N.Y. 75, 68 N.E. 135
(1903); Harrah v. Home Furniture, Inc., 67 Nev. 114, 214 P.2d 1o16 (1950). See Martz
v. Selig Dry Goods Co., 76 Ind. App. 135, 131 N.E. 528 (1921).
"'Goldfield v. Brewbaker Motors, Inc., 36 Ala. App. 152, 54 So. 2d 797 (951);
Lazarus v. Hall, 287 Ky. 199, 152 S.W.2d 592 (1941).
-'See note 4 supra.
!See cases cited note i supra.
-3Ewell v. State, 2o7 Md. 283, 114 A.2d 66, 69 (1955). In referring to the common
law duty of support the court said, "The meaning of the term necessaries was rela-
tive, elastic and dependent upon circumstances, that is, the means and station in life
of the couple. The liability of a husband was not limited merely to articles necessary
to sustain life or to preserve decency but extended to things which would be desirable
and suitable in view of the rank, fortune, earning capacity of the husband and the
mode of living of the couple."
- It is also said that when one furnishes necessaries, upon the husband's failure to
pay, there arises an implied obligation in law on a quasi-contractual basis. Carr v.
Anderson, 154 Minn. 162, 191 NAV. 407 (1923). Cf. Adler v. Adler, 171 Pa. Super.
5o8, go A.2d 389 (1952).
2"A person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is re-
quired to make restitution to the other." Restatement, Restitution § 1 (1937)-
i96o]
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agency.2 Furthermore, restitution cannot be invoked when it con-
clusively appears that the credit was extended solely to the wife,30 or
when the parties are separated through fault of the wife.
3 '
In dealing with the liability created by the husband's failure to
provide necessaries, some courts have referred to this liability in terms
of agency rather than restitution. This agency is characterized either as
an agency implied in law or as a presumption of agency. In some cases
the courts say that there is an implied agency in law in the wife to
pledge her husband's credit32 on the theory that the husband's assent
is conclusively presumed.33 In other cases3 4 the courts assert that there
is a prima facie presumption of agency in the wife to purchase neces-
saries for herself and the household, 35 which presumption arises from
the fact of cohabitation.3 6 This presumption is one of fact, not of law,3 7
2'James McCreery & Co. v. Martin, 84 N.J.L. 626, 87 Ad. 433 (1913); Wanamaker
v. Weaver, 176 N.Y. 75, 68 N.E. 135 (1903).
'°Herring v. Holden, 88 Ga. App. 212, 76 S.E.2d 515 (1953); Mathews Furniture
Co. v. La Bella, 44 So. 2d 16o (La. App. 195o).
"Allen v. Selig Dry Goods Co., go Ind. App. 29o, 165 N.E. 338 (929);
Kerner v. Eastern Dispensary & Cas. Hosp., 210 Md. 375, 123 A.2d 333 (1956);
Mihalcoe v. Holub, 13o Va. 425, 107 S.E. 704 (1921).
32McFerren v. Goldsmith-Stem Co., 137 Md. 573, 113 At. 107 (1921); Fisher
v. Drew, 247 Mass. 178, 141 N.E. 875 (1924); Bergh v. Warner, 47 Minn. 250, 5o N.W.
77, 78 (1891); East v. King, 77 Miss. 738, 27 So. 6o8 (19oo); McQuay v. McQuay, 86
Mont. 535, 284 Pac. 532 (193o); Bostick v. Brower, 22 Misc. 709, 49 N.Y. Supp. 1o46,
1o47 (Sup. Ct. 1898).
"Fisher v. Drew, 247 Mass. 178, 141 N.E. 875 (1924).
31The same courts may use both agency implied in law and presumption of
agency arising from the fact of cohabitation in slightly different factual situations.
For example, when the goods are necessaries which the husband has failed to sup-
ply, a court may reason that there is an agency implied in law in the wife to pledge
her husband's credit. However, when a third party has furnished necessaries and
the husband alleges that he has previously supplied the goods, a court may say
that there is a presumption of agency arising from the fact of cohabitation. See Bergh
v. Warner, 47 Minn. 250, 50 N.W. 77, 78 (1891); McFerren v. Goldsmith-Stern Co.,
137 Md. 573, 113 AtI. 107 (1921).
'Cooper v. Haseltine, 5o Ind. App. 4o0, 98 N.E. 437 (1912); Adkins v. Hastings,
138 Md. 454, 114 At. 288 (1921); Johnson v. Briscoe, 1o4 Mo. App. 493, 79 S.W. 498
(19o4); James McCreery & Co. v. Martin, 84 N.J.L. 626, 87 At. 433 (1913);Wanamaker
v. Weaver, 176 N.Y. 75, 68 N.E. 135 (1903).
-This presumption is founded upon the fact that in modern society the wife
is the manager of the household and is clothed with authority to pledge her hus-
band's credit for articles of ordinary household use. The presumption appears to
be confined to purchases of necessaries. Bergh v. Warner, 47 Minn. 250, 50 N.W.
77 (1891). The courts apparently reason that it is easy for a third party to conclude
that on the basis of the marital relationship the wife is the agent of the husband.
However, this conclusion is patently inconsistent with the Restatement of Agency
§ 22 and authorities on agency, Mechem, Agency §§ 49-50 (4th ed. 1952). In view of
this, the writer prefers to relate this presumption from the fact of cohabitation more
closely to restitution rather than to apparent authority.
'7Wanamaker v. Weaver, 176 N.Y. 75, 68 N.E. 135, 137 (1903).
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and it can be rebutted by proof that the credit was extended solely to
the wife,38 that the husband gave notice to the merchant not to allow
his wife to purchase on his credit,39 that the wife had been amply sup-
plied with articles of the same character as those furnished, 40 or that
she had been furnished with money with which to purchase them.41
Courts that refer to this restitutionary liability in terms of agency
recognize that this agency is to be distinguished from a true agency 42
because none of the incidents of a true agency are present.43 But under
this questionable use of agency terminology the wife is permitted to
impose liability upon her husband against his will 44 and in spite of
the fact that he may have terminated her authority and given notice
of this termination to those who have previously extended credit.45
Such predication of liability on the theory of agency is in direct con-
flict with the Restatement of Agency, which provides that the marital
relationship by its own force does not give rise to the existence of agen-
cy. 46
However, the courts apparently reach the same result in this area
regardless of the terminology used-restitution or agency. Neverthe-
less, there are practical problems which may arise from the use of
this agency terminology, e.g., when a court has reasoned that a pre-
sumption of agency arises from the fact of cohabitation. What should
be the logical conclusion when the parties cease to cohabit? The pre-
sumption of agency implies that when the parties separate, even
through fault of the husband, the wife no longer has authority
to pledge her husband's credit for necessaries. However, the majority
rule appears to be that when the husband is at fault in the separation
the wife is still entitled to his support for necessaries. 47 The fallacy
in the use of agency terminology in this situation becomes evident
when cohabitation ceases to exist, for then these courts no longer
have any basis for applying the agency theory. The obvious solution
is to rely on restitution from the outset as a basis for this liability.
IsNoel v. O'Neill, 128 Md. 202, 97 At. 513 (1916).
mVickstrom v. Peck, 155 App. Div. 523, 14o N.Y. Supp. 570 (Sup. Ct. 1913).
"Wanamaker v. Weaver, 176 N.Y. 75, 68 N.E. 135 (1903).
"Guthrie v. Bobo, 32 Ala. App. 355, 26 So. 2d 203 (1946).
"Bergh v. Warner, 47 Minn. 250, 50 N.W. 77 (1891); Johnson v. Briscoe, 1O4
Mo. App. 493, 79 S.W. 498 (1904); Wanamaker v. Weaver, 176 N.Y. 75, 68 N.E. 135
(19o03).
'3Mechem, Agency § 49 (4th ed. 1952).
"Bostick v. Brower, 22 Misc. 709, 49 N.Y. Supp. 1o46, 1o47 (Sup. Ct. 1898).
Is La Mode Ready to Wear, Inc. v. Wallace, 52 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. App. 1932).
"Restatement (Second), Agency § 22, comment b (1958).
"Allen v. Selig Dry Goods Co., 90 Ind. App. 260, 165 N.E. 338 (1929); East v.
King, 77 Miss. 738, 27 So. 608 (19oo).
